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          NO. 44682 
 
          Fremont County Case No.  
          CR-2016-274 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Greene failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 




Greene Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Forty-seven-year-old Greene sexually assaulted his fiancée’s daughter’s 16-
year-old friend, M.D., while both he and M.D. were under the influence of alcohol.  (PSI, 
pp.4-7.)  M.D. was at Greene’s house for a New Year’s Eve Party and had passed out; 
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when she awoke Greene came into the room, “tugg[ed] on [her] jeans,” “grop[ed] [her] 
breast,” penetrated her vagina with his fingers, performed oral sex on her, and “‘then 
had sex with her from behind.’”  (PSI, pp.4-7.)   
 The state charged Greene with rape.  (R., pp.45-46.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Greene pled guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to a child.  (R., 
pp.108-16.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with six years 
fixed.  (R., pp.141-43.)  Greene filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.148-50.)  Greene 
also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court 
granted by reducing Greene’s sentence to a unified sentence of 10 years, with four 
years fixed.  (R., pp.151-52, 176-77.)   
Greene asserts the district court abused its discretion by declining to further 
reduce his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the 
denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, Greene must “show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Greene has failed to satisfy his burden.   
The only arguably “new” information Greene provided in support of his Rule 35 
motion was a letter in which Greene’s fiancée opined that Greene is “not a sexual threat 
to society” and that the sentence he received did “not fit the crime.”  (Defendant’s 
Exhibit A; see also 1/24/17 Tr., p.84, L.14 – p.86, L.22.)  Apart from that letter, the 
balance of Greene’s argument in support of a reduction of sentence focused on 
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information of which the court was already aware, including Greene’s LSI score which 
suggested he was a moderate risk to reoffend, his relatively minimal criminal record, the 
recommendations of the substance abuse evaluator and Greene’s therapist that Greene 
receive treatment in the community, and the role that alcohol played in Greene’s 
offense.  (1/24/17 Tr., p.86, L.23 – p.89, L.22.)  After considering all of that information, 
and reevaluating its sentence in light of the evidence before it, the district court granted 
Greene’s motion and reduced the fixed portion of his sentence by two years.  (1/24/17 
Tr., p.110, L.20 – p.113, L.5; R., pp.176-77.)  In doing so, the court noted the 
modification would give Greene “the opportunity to receive the treatment that he needs 
sooner, much sooner, two years sooner, than he would have received it otherwise” 
while still otherwise accomplishing the objectives of criminal punishment.  (1/24/17 Tr., 
p.110, L.20 – p.111, L.20.) 
On appeal, Greene does not argue that the court failed to exercise reason when 
considering his Rule 35 motion.  Nor does he contend that the court failed to act within 
the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards that 
allow it to reduce a sentence in light of new or additional information provided after the 
sentence was imposed.  Instead, for the first time on appeal, Greene argues that the 
court abused its discretion by not further reducing his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 
motion because, he contends, the court made a clearly erroneous finding at sentencing 
that Greene “suffers from no substantial mental illnesses … and is not in need of mental 
health treatment.”  (Tr., p.63, Ls.10-12 (cited in Appellant’s brief, p.6).)  Greene’s 
argument fails to show an abuse of discretion for two reasons.   
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First, Green never asserted to the district court as a basis for reducing his 
sentence that the court’s finding regarding his mental health condition was erroneous.  
(See generally R., pp.151-52; 1/24/17 Tr.; Exhibit 1.)  Having never been asked to 
reconsider Greene’s sentence on this basis, the district court could not have abused its 
discretion by failing to do so.    
Second, even if Greene could challenge a factual finding made at sentencing for 
the first time on appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, a review of the record 
shows the court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.  Under the heading, 
“Current Mental Health Concerns” on the first page of Greene’s “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental 
Health Examination Report,” the mental health examiner specifically checked “No” in 
response to the question:  “GAIN assessment and/or other resources as noted above 
indicate that a serious mental illness (SMI) may be present?”  (PSI, p.89.)  The 
examiner did indicate that “Greene reported symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of a 
mood disorder and the possible existence of a stress disorder,” but he did not find that 
Greene was suffering from any serious mental illness.  (PSI, p.89; see also p.75.)  That 
the examiner later indicated “Greene presents with SMI or MH needs as noted  above 
in 19-2524 report” and that “mental health treatment is recommended if released to 
the community” (PSI, p.90 (emphases added)) does not contradict the examiner’s 
conclusion, or the district court’s findings, that Greene does not suffer from any serious 
mental illness and does not require mental health treatment.  The examiner himself 
clearly did not believe that Greene’s mental health issues related to his potential mood 
and stress disorders warranted either classification as a serious mental illness or even 
treatment while incarcerated.  (PSI, pp.89-90.)  Greene has failed to show the district 
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court’s finding, which is consistent with the mental health examination report, is clearly 
erroneous. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and arguments 
presented to it and reasonably exercised its discretion in reducing the fixed portion of 
Greene’s sentence by two years.  That Greene would have liked the district court to 
further reduce his sentence based on Greene’s post hoc assertion that the court did not 
adequately consider the impact of his mental health issues on its sentencing decisions 
does not establish an abuse of discretion.  
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
granting, in part, Greene’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
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